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Abstract: The current analysis takes a relevance-theoretic view of the two most 
frequently applied mono-lexemic causal connectives in Modern Greek discourse, i.e. 
γiati and epiδι. The suggestion is that epiδι-introduced clauses are to be treated 
conceptually, while γiati performs either a conceptual or procedural function depending 
on its use. This treatment follows up on Kitis’s (2006) findings regarding the operation 
of the connectives under discussion. It will be concluded that the relevance-theoretic 
based results corroborate Kitis’s account and, further, offer a more refined explication 
of the constraints on the application of the conjuncts. In fact, it will be illustrated that 
the theory in application offers the required tools for distinguishing among three types 
of procedural meaning underlying the interpretation of γiati.  
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0. Introduction  
The purpose of this discussion is to examine the distinction in meaning between the two 
most frequently applied mono-lexemic causal connectives in Modern Greek discourse, 
i.e. γiati and epiδι implementing the relevance-theoretic model of pragmatic analysis, 
and, more specifically, Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account of connectives in terms of a 
conceptual or procedural approach.  
In the current analysis the idea is that epiδι-clauses are to be treated conceptually, 
while γiati performs both functions depending on its use. This information is compared 
to Kitis’s (2006) findings regarding the behaviour of the connectives under discussion. 
A reanalysis in relevance-theoretic terms of her interpretation of the subordinators will 
be attempted with a view to checking the claims that γiati is a broadly functioning 
discourse connective, rather than a causal connective, as opposed to epiδι warranting 
causal and explanatory coherence.  
Moreover, the line of argumentation employed in this discussion is taken to affect 
aspects of the procedural method of examining discourse markers, as prescribed by 
Blakemore. In particular, the supposition is challenged that procedural constraints are 
meant to operate towards the generation of implicatures only. As will be shown, context 
selection pertains to a much broader range of derivations of pragmatic effects.  
It is surmised that the relevance-theoretic based results corroborate Kitis’s account 
and, further, offer a more finely grained explication of the constraints on the application 
of the conjuncts. In fact, it will be illustrated that the theory in application offers the 
required tools for distinguishing among three types of procedural meaning underlying 
the interpretation of γiati. Hence, quite apart from the distinction between conceptual 
and procedural categories of causal meaning, we may also postulate the operation of the 
latter category in three distinct types of pragmatic enrichment: one affecting the 
constituents of the logical form of a sentence, one contributing to the explicitness of the 
related utterance by making up unencoded constituents, and finally, one pertaining to 
the higher-order explicatures involved in the determination of the intended meaning of 
the utterance.  
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1. Procedural discourse markers: their properties  
Our claim in this discussion follows up on Kitis’s suggestion that γiati appears to 
perform a procedural function, in Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) terms, “orienting the hearer 
to access the clause it introduces as relevant to what has preceded it” (2006:245).  
According to Blakemore, procedural expressions “do not encode a constituent of a 
conceptual representation (or even indicate a concept), but guide the comprehension 
process so that the hearer ends up with a conceptual representation” (2002: 90-91). 
Procedural encodings guide the audience towards an inferential route that results in a 
conceptual representation. For instance, consider the procedural function of after all in 
the following example:  
 
(1) (a) Ben can open Tom’s safe. (b) After all, he knows the combination.  
[Blakemore, 2002: 95] 
 
Here, the specific discourse connective is used to guide the addressee to the inference 
that the proposition in (1b) is a premise for the deduction of the proposition expressed 
by (1a). Thus, the speaker indicates in this way that segment (b) is relevant by virtue of 
strengthening an existing assumption.  
On her account, the meanings of procedural discourse connectives are linked to 
cognitive effects that an input may achieve by means of a contextual implication, 
strengthening or eliminating an assumption (Blakemore, 2002: 95). In this sense, but 
encodes an inferential route that ends in the elimination of a contextual assumption, 
while so is linked to the effect of contextual implications. This line of interpretation 
basically amounts to the generalization that procedural expressions achieve relevance by 
means of constraining or manipulating the deductive process implemented in deriving 
an implicature.  
However, Blakemore’s account is not taken to exhaust a full investigation of 
procedural meaning. Specifically, one of the main worries of a relevance-theoretic 
account of effective comprehension relies on determining the full propositional form of 
an utterance by virtue of resolving issues of underdeterminacy, a concomitant of verbal 
communication falling short of encoding the intended meaning of the speaker. The gap 
between the lexically encoded meaning and maximal propositionality is bridged by 
pragmatic inference. And procedural cases of connectives are viewed in this discussion 
as being operative to this end, i.e. that of supplying contextual information as pragmatic 
input required for determining the interpretation of the main clause utterance.  
Hall (2007) discusses but from this angle:  
 
Discourse connectives seem mainly to constrain the recovery of implicatures, but since the 
function of procedural information is to constrain pragmatic inference, it could be expected to 
play a role in other pragmatic processes too- for instance, given that linguistic decoding doesn’t 
produce fully propositional forms, it’s likely that procedural meaning could also constrain the 
development of logical form into the proposition expressed (156).  
 
The current analysis draws on Hall’s proposal for a redefinition of procedural meaning 
in examining the operation of γiati-clauses in a wide range of contextual uses. As will 
be illustrated, the particular conjunct is applied in discourse to make a contribution to 
the recovery of speaker meaning.  
In particular, the suggestion is that the inferential task performed by procedural uses 
of the conjunct at issue is not contextually invariant. We may distinguish different types 
of procedural operation of γiati, depending on the kind of contribution that the 
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conjunction makes to propositionhood in the main clause. The following examples are 
taken to represent the set of putative categories of procedural γiati.  
 
1.1 The case of γiati  
The following examples illustrate procedural uses of γiati, which is rendered in 
shorthand for because as BC (1) in the English translation1, whereas epiδi is glossed as 
BC (2). Interestingly, the use of the latter connective sounds unacceptable and is, thus, 
marked as such.  
 
(2) Και πρέπει να μου δώσεις και τη διατριβή σου, γιατί/ *επειδή σιγά να μην τη 
βρω αλλού.  
‘You must also give me your dissertation, BC (1)/ *BC (2) there’s no way I’ll 
find it elsewhere’.  
 
(3) Θα πάω αύριο στην τράπεζα, γιατί/ *επειδή μεθαύριο έχουν απεργία.  
 ‘I’ll go to the bank tomorrow, BC (1)/ *BC (2) they’re on strike the day after 
tomorrow’. 
 
(4) A: Να φωνάξουμε όλα τα παιδιά να συνεννοηθούμε για τα ψώνια που θα κάνουμε. 
 ‘We should get all the guys here so we can sort out shopping issues’.  
 
 Β: Εγώ δε θέλω να “συνεννοηθούμε”, γιατί/* επειδή όπου λαλούν πολλοί κοκόροι 
αργεί να ξημερώσει. 
 ‘I don’t want to “sort out” anything, BC (1)/ *BC (2) too many cooks spoil the 
broth!’ 
 
(5) Η γκαντεμιά του το προκάλεσε, γιατί/ *επειδή είμαι και λίγο προληπτικός. 
 ‘His bad lack caused it, BC (1)/ * BC (2) I’m a little superstitious!’ 
 
(6) Ο Γιάννης είναι στο σπίτι, γιατί/ *επειδή τα φώτα είναι αναμμένα.  
 ‘John is home, BC (1)/ *BC (2) the lights are on’.  
 
In all example sentences (2-6), the propositional form of the main clause is seen as 
pragmatically enriched (by means of referent assignment, semantic disambiguation or 
concept adjustment)2 to yield the intended interpretation of the utterance. Here, 
however, we focus on the contribution that the conjunction makes in this direction.  
Consider the case in (2). The presence of the γiati-introduced clause appears to reveal 
the contextual information that the addressee is the only holder of the dissertation. The 
recovery of the above-mentioned contextual assumption may initially involve 
straightening out the intended interpretation of the adverbial clause. However this may 
be, this pragmatic input affects the explicit content of the main clause (2’), too, to the 
extent that it reveals some unarticulated element of the main clause, i.e. εσύ, that the 
γiati-utterance used as a coherence device is presumed to link to.  
 
(2’) Και πρέπει να μου δώσεις και τη διατριβή σου εσύ (και μόνο εσύ), γιατί σιγά να 
μην τη βρω αλλού.  
‘You and you only must also give me your dissertation, because there’s no way 
I’ll find it elsewhere’. 
 
                                                 
1 All translations into English throughout the article are mine.  
2 For a discussion of resolving underdeterminacy issues see Carston (2002).  
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In this sense, the use of the adverbial clause contributes to determining the proposition 
expressed of the main clause by means of hinting at the retrieval of unencoded 
constituents, like εσύ, the explication of which is taken to justify the explicit use of the 
specific coherence conjunct.3  
In (3) and (4) the γiati-clause offers again a case of pragmatic embellishment 
involved in reaching the ultimate interpretation intended by the speaker. But the type of 
contribution they make to the meaning representation of the corresponding utterances is 
different to that in (2). Specifically, in (3) the γiati-utterance seems to guide the hearer 
to the focal meaning of ‘tomorrow’ in the particular context. While the deictic is 
temporally grounded in the main clause, the use of the adverbial clause performs the 
pragmatic function of contrasting the specific lexical concept as designating a working 
day to that of a non-working day. Similarly, in (4) the verb ‘συνεννοηθούμε’ is used 
ironically to express the opposite of its regular meaning. This is ascribed to the ‘echoic 
interpretive use’ of the phrase (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995, Wilson and Sperber, 
1988). Specifically, speaker B attributes a thought to speaker A in order to report it, 
only in this case expressing at the same time a dissociating attitude to it. Evidently, the 
echoic use of the verb in question is inferentially supplied by the use of the γiati-
utterance. In the absence of the particular clause framing a proverb, the intended irony is 
not communicated.  
So far in all three cases, the adverbial clause is seen as contributing to determining 
the proposition expressed of the corresponding sentences. However, unlike (2) offering 
a case of making up for a missing constituent, the conjunction in (3) and (4) appears to 
hinge on a lexical concept of the logical form of the main clause regulating its meaning. 
This type of operation of the connective on the main clause may be viewed in terms of 
ad hoc concept construction, as discussed by Carston (2002, 2004a, 2004b), a kind of 
pragmatic adjustment which can either ‘strengthen’ or ‘narrow’ the respective concept.  
On the other hand, procedural instances of γiati are not only thought of as relating to 
explicatures developing the propositional form in an utterance. Cases (5, 6) suggest that 
the contribution they make to explicitness pertains to possible higher-order explicatures. 
For instance, consider (5). Here the subordination is taken to divulge the higher-order 
explicature that it attaches to. In this case, it assists the hearer in inferring the 
propositional attitude that the speaker thinks it possible for bad luck to have caused the 
accident. Under this interpretation, the speaker’s propositional attitude to the main 
clause is made explicit on account of the application of the adverbial clause. In the same 
vein, the connective in (6) is used to explicate the assumption schema into which the 
proposition of the main clause is embedded, i.e. the speaker concludes that John is 
home.  
In summation, so far there seem to be three categories of meaning for γiati on a 
relevance-theoretic account, each examined in relation to the type of contribution the 
connective makes to the explicitness of the utterance. Firstly, it may contribute to 
                                                 
3 The kind of ‘unencoded constituent’ underdeterminacy proposed here is akin to Kent Bach’s (1994) 
notion of constituent underdetermination representing a type of impliciture. On this view, a additional 
propositional constituent is required to complete a proposition. A contrastive explanation in a because-
clause of the sort provided below seems to resolve this kind of underdeterminacy:  
 
(12) Bill demoted Mickey [rather than fire him] because he was still needed. [Bach, 1994]  
 
The information in the brackets is inferentially supplied, and although Bach does not say so expressly, the 
adverbial clause must have a bearing on the making up of the unencoded element of the proposition in the 
main clause. In this respect, the interpretation of the specific example falls into our class of connective-
stimulated resolution of ‘unencoded constituent’ underdeterminacy.  
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sorting out a lexical concept of the logical form of the utterance (3-4), or, secondly, it 
may expand the proposition of the utterance by supplying an unencoded concept (2). 
Finally, γiati-clauses can stimulate or indicate higher-order explicature descriptions (5-
6).  
Before taking up the issue of the Modern Greek conceptual causal connectives, it 
might be useful at this phase of our analysis to discuss the defining properties of 
conceptual discourse markers, in general. 
 
2. Conceptual discourse markers: their properties  
The view posited in the current analysis is that every use of a causal marker that does 
not fall into any one of the interpretation types of procedural cause stipulated earlier 
must perforce be conceptual. Rather than bearing any relation to the explication of an 
utterance, they are seen as operating truth-conditionally4. Although the distinction 
between conceptual and procedural meaning is not co-extensive with the distinction 
between truth-conditional and non-truth conditional meaning (Wilson and Sperber, 
1993), a concept ordinarily has truth-conditional properties.  
In this regard, a conceptual connective contributes to the truth-conditional content of 
the proposition expressed in an utterance. In this connection, a causal connective is read 
conceptually when taken to conjoin the propositional contents of p and q in a q because 
p sequence. Moreover, the truth-value of the sentence depends on whether the causal 
connection actually holds. In this respect, interpretations of causally connected 
segments are viewed in connection to evaluating the validity of the causal relation of the 
conjoined segments.  
For instance, evaluating the causal connection in (7) 
 
(7) John came back because he loved her [Sweetser, 1990] 
 
may result in its cancellation, say in the context of disagreement. In this connection, it 
can be negated (8).  
  
(8) John didn’t come back because he loved her but because he didn’t like living 
abroad.  
 
Our account of conceptual connectives is compatible with the statement made by 
Sperber and Wilson (1986/95), Wilson and Sperber (1993) that a concept can be the 
input to logical inference rules. Here is a potential operation of the deductive process in 
evaluating (7):  
 
(9) a. Linguistic input: There is an assumption (of causal relation) expressed  
 b. Context: John is not the kind of person who would do that.  
c. Contextual effect: It is impossible that this is the case: He came back 
BECAUSE he loved her.  
                                                 
4 Our suggestion follows Kempson’s (1975: 214) observation that the causality marker therefore used in 
co-ordinate structures (non-parenthetically), as in the following example, can be embedded within the 
scope of a conditional so that the truth value of the sentence depends on whether the connection holds. 
 
(13) If Bill hit Mary and therefore she was covered in bruises, she will have won her suit for damages.  
 
On this interpretation, therefore seems to contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance that contains 
it.  
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Finally, non-conceptual cause contrasts with conceptual interpretations in that only 
the latter seem to survive the if…then logical operator test of distinguishing truth-
conditional from non-truth-conditional meaning. Thus, while (7) can be embedded into 
a construction like (10), the same is not true of any one of the examples in (2-6).  
 
(10) If John came back because he loved her, he’s totally crazy. 
 
(*2’) Εάν πρέπει να μου δώσεις και τη διατριβή σου, γιατί σιγά να μην τη βρω αλλού, 
θα πάθω υστερία.  
 ‘If you must also give me your dissertation, because there’s no way I’ll find it 
elsewhere, I’ll go into hysterics’.  
 
(*3’) Εάν πάω αύριο στην τράπεζα, γιατί μεθαύριο έχουν απεργία, θα πάθω υστερία. 
‘If I go to the bank tomorrow, because they’re on strike the day after tomorrow, 
I’ll go into hysterics’.  
 
(*4’) A: Να φωνάξουμε όλα τα παιδιά να συνεννοηθούμε για τα ψώνια που θα 
κάνουμε. 
  ‘We should get all the guys here so we can sort out shopping issues’. 
 Β:  Εάν δε θέλω να “συνεννοηθούμε”, γιατί όπου λαλούν πολλοί κοκόροι αργεί 
να ξημερώσει, εσύ να κάνεις ό,τι θέλεις.  
  ‘If I don’t want to “sort out” anything, because too many cooks spoil the 
broth, you can do anything you want’.  
 
(*5’)  Εάν η γκαντεμιά του το προκάλεσε, γιατί είμαι και λίγο προληπτικός, δε 
ξανακάνω παρέα μ’ αυτόν. 
‘If his bad lack caused it, because I’m a little superstitious, I won’t hang out with 
him again’.  
 
(*6’)  Εάν ο Γιάννης είναι στο σπίτι, γιατί τα φώτα είναι αναμμένα, η γυναίκα του 
λείπει.  
‘If John is home, because the lights are on, his wife’s absent’. 
 
2.1 The concept of epiδι and the conceptual use of γiati  
Notice that the conceptually read example in (7) or its negation counterpart in (8) can be 
readily translated using either epiδι or γiati:  
 
(11)  Ο Γιάννης επέστρεψε επειδή / γιατί την αγαπούσε. 
  
Having illustrated that epiδι cannot encode procedural meaning (2-6), it transpires that it 
can only be used conceptually. On the other hand, as was suggested, γiati can perform 
procedural functions. Nevertheless, this is not a permanent quality of the connective. In 
a way, then, γiati, much like because, can incorporate both types of meaning, i.e. 
conceptual and procedural, depending on its application. In fact, a conceptual causality 
environment (11), i.e. joining straightforwardly sentences in terms of the propositions 
expressed, seems to impose a smaller, if not negligible constraint on 
intersubstitutability.  
Kitis (1994, 1996, 2006) indicates the versatility of γiati and concludes that it is to be 
described on this basis as a broadly functioning argumentative discourse connective 
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rather than as a causal one (2006:244). In light of evidence derived from their 
evolutionary course, etymological make-up and versatility of functions of the two 
connectives, she tends to treat epiδι as a prototypical subordinating causal connective, in 
that it guarantees causal and explanatory coherence. The explicatory character of the 
connective is seen as being motivated in connection to epiδι clauses joining 
straightforwardly sentences in terms of the propositions expressed (Kitis, 2006: endnote 
6) and its use is appropriate in explicitly articulated sentences. At the same time, Kitis 
(2006) notes that γiati may handle cases originally assigned to epiδι, alluding to possible 
conceptual uses (250), which assumes that the marker at issue has its share in 
guaranteeing explanatory coherence. This makes full sense in our analysis of either 
conjunct as a concept that makes a contribution to the literal, truth-conditional content 
of the determinate proposition expressed in a q because p sequence as a whole.  
On the other hand, in the following minimal pair in (12), γiati can hardly be replaced 
by epiδι without a change in meaning. The (a) version is to be explicated procedurally 
in that it implies the conditional if I don’t go within the conjunction, whereas the epiδi 
sequence is understood as encompassing the cause-effect relation of the propositions 
conjoined.  
 
(12)  a. Αποφάσισα να πάω στο γιατρό, γιατί δε με βλέπω καλά. 
 b. Αποφάσισα να πάω στο γιατρό επειδή δε με βλέπω καλά.  
  
In this light, it transpires that, leaving aside the connective used, the linguistic 
environment in a causal sequence may be such that it allows for either interpretation, i.e. 
conceptual or procedural, as in (12). To this extent, the specification of the type of 
connection between the clauses is taken to relate to the selection of the connective. 
Hence, epiδι, the connective that has been reserved for expressing conceptual meaning, 
is used to contribute to a conceptual interpretation (12b). On the other hand, the 
polyfunctional γiati is assigned the task of priming the alternative (procedural) 
interpretation (12a).  
 
3. Concluding remarks  
In summation, the results of the current analysis seem to corroborate Kitis’s (2006) 
suggestion that γiati can be a procedural causal discourse marker. In fact, as is shown, it 
contributes to the explicatures of the main clause-utterances of causal sequences in three 
discreet types of procedure. In addition to this, it is proposed in accord with Kitis, that 
the specific connective is polyfunctional, in that it may also perform conceptual 
functions. On the other hand, epiδι offers a constant expression of conceptual causal 
connections. Finally, in cases allowing the use of either one connective, epiδι fulfils its 
prescribed role, while γiati offers an alternative linguistic resource to use procedurally.  
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